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Health Care Administration, Taipei Medical University, Taipei City, TaiwanA B S T R A C TObjective: To elicit a patient’s willingness to participate in a diabetes
pay-for-performance for patient (P4P4P) program using a discrete choice
experiment method. Methods: The survey was conducted in March
2013. Our sample was drawn from patients with diabetes at ﬁve
hospitals in Taiwan (International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, Ninth Revision,
Clinical Modiﬁcation code 250). The sample size was 838 patients. The
discrete choice experiment questionnaire included the attributes
monthly cash rewards, exercise time, diet control, and program dura-
tion. We estimated a bivariate probit model to derive willingness-to-
accept levels after accounting for the characteristics (e.g., severity and
comorbidity) of patients with diabetes. Results: The preferred program
was a 3-year program involving 30 minutes of exercise per day and
ﬂexible diet control. Offering an incentive of approximately US $67 in
cash per month appears to increase the likelihood that patients withee front matter Copyright & 2015, International S
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ndence to: Tsung-Tai Chen, Department of Public
R.O.C.diabetes will participate in the preferred P4P4P program by
approximately 50%. Conclusions: Patients with more disadvanta-
geous characteristics (e.g., elderly, low income, greater comorbidity,
and severity) could have less to gain from participating in the program
and thus require a higher monetary incentive to compensate for the
disutility caused by participating in the program’s activities. Our
result demonstrates that a modest ﬁnancial incentive could increase
the likelihood of program participation after accounting for the
attributes of the P4P4P program and patients’ characteristics.
Keywords: diabetes, discrete choice experiment, pay-for-performance
for patient (P4P4P), willingness to accept.
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Many studies indicate that effects of awarding bonuses to physi-
cians/hospitals (pay-for-performance [P4P]) are mixed or nonexis-
tent [1–7]. Such ﬁndings indicate a need for further research to
explore the effectiveness of P4P. One study also reports that
although patient-, physician-, and hospital-level factors affect
variations in quality of care, at least 50% of these variations can
be explained by patient-level factors [8]. Another study demon-
strates that unhealthy or risky patient behaviors have a greater
inﬂuence on health status than do medical services [9] and these
patient behaviors account for 40% of premature deaths in America
[10]. These study results suggest that patient factors may be more
important drivers of patient health and hospital quality of care
than are medical services or hospital rewards.
Intervention at the patient level involves two types of strat-
egies. One is the promotion of patient adherence to physician’sprescriptions. The second is enhancing the patient’s healthy
behaviors. This study focuses on the latter factor. Although
numerous factors affect a patient’s health behavior, we primarily
highlight rewards for the patient, even though this strategy may
be somewhat controversial. Health interventions such as a
restricted diet and requiring regular physical exercise appear to
constrain individual freedom of choice (e.g., lifestyle). From an
economic perspective, however, not all those who engage in
unhealthy behavior (e.g., smoking) have rational beliefs (e.g.,
maximize beneﬁts or minimize losses) regarding such behaviors
or a desire to change them [11]. According to asymmetric
behavior, when patients may have irrational attitudes concerning
their unhealthy behaviors, the government or employers should
intervene to assist individuals without limiting their freedom of
choice [11]. Under such conditions, health intervention by
the government is perhaps permissible. Considering the example
of exercise in the form of walking, individuals may adopt anociety for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).
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V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 5 7 8 – 5 8 6 579inactive attitude toward walking because they irrationally believe
that changing their exercise habits will be difﬁcult. In such a
context, a government or employer could design an incentive
program to motivate individuals to overcome their internal (e.g.,
psychological) barriers [11,12]. These internal barriers arise
because most individuals are motivated by actions that produce
tangible beneﬁts (e.g., time costs) but are much less motivated by
actions that do not produce tangible progress (e.g., reduce the
long-term risk of an adverse outcome) toward a goal [11].
Humans generally discount future intangible beneﬁts, and hence,
losing weight or exercising regularly, for example, is difﬁcult
because indulgent behavior was not substantially responsible for
the adverse outcome. Thus, individuals may not accept a lifestyle
intervention program. If a government or employer were to offer
a cash incentive, however, this could increase the likelihood of
participating in a walking program [12].
Incentives/rewards for patients are effective. Many meta-
analyses and randomized clinical trial studies demonstrate that
patients receiving rewards are more willing to engage in preven-
tive behaviors, including quitting smoking or ceasing drug abuse
[13–18]. Certain studies even suggest that offering small rewards
to patients may achieve better and longer-term outcomes for
patients than does rewarding physicians/hospitals [9,19–21]. In
addition to the advantage of improved patient outcomes, incen-
tives allow insurers greater ﬁnancial savings because payments
to patients for preventive behaviors do not involve paying service
delivery fees to physicians [9]. Thus, adapting a P4P design that is
used to target physicians to instead reward patients, thus creat-
ing a pay-for-performance for patients (P4P4P) plan [9,22], may
lead to improved outcomes for patients. Taking a diabetes-
related P4P4P or lifestyle intervention program as an example,
studies demonstrate that when attempting to improve inter-
mediate A1c outcomes (e.g., A1c o 7%), most of the variations
lie on the patient side. Patient-level factors account for most of
the change in A1c (98%) [23]. Less than 8% of patient A1c-level
variations can be explained by physician factors, and a much
lower percentage of the variation can be explained by hospital
factors [24,25]. For diabetes, the most effective strategy may be to
target individual patients and not physicians or hospitals.
Most studies related to diabetes lifestyle interventions derive
willingness to pay (WTP) via discrete choice experiments (DCEs)
[26,27]. Far fewer studies examine the amount of money that
reﬂects patients’ willingness to accept (WTA) participation in
P4P4P or lifestyle intervention projects that consist of various
program attributes and levels. WTP and WTA are different
concepts used to measure the value of participating in lifestyle
intervention programs. WTP is the maximum amount that a
person would be willing to offer for a good, and WTA is the
minimum monetary amount required for an individual to bear
some cost or utility loss. Patients with diabetes may be aware of
the potential future beneﬁts of participating in the program.
Program participation, however, may generate uncomfortable
feelings. Thus, patients with diabetes may underestimate the
potential future beneﬁts and irrationally persist in their current
unhealthy behavior (e.g., inactivity and less control over diet). For
such patients, especially those who need to alter their complicat-
ing, unhealthy behaviors, which may involve substantial energy
and time, such efforts often involve sacriﬁcing positive lifestyle
experiences (reducing personal utility) [28]. Thus, patients are
less likely to be willing to pay to participate but more likely to be
motivated by being paid (thus exhibiting higher WTA) to over-
come physical and attitudinal barriers, which may incur a loss of
utility due to program participation [12,29–31]. As a result,
deriving the WTA value of receiving health intervention is a
crucial aspect of P4P4P design.
In addition, other factors argue for the use of theWTA approach
to value the beneﬁt of patients with diabetes participating intargeted health programs. One is that P4P programs may generate
inequality concerns [32], and P4P4P could help to ameliorate health
disparities [22,33]. Furthermore, although a P4P4P plan may help to
support the rights of disadvantaged patients, it is unclear whether
the disadvantaged persons could be incentivized to participate in
such a program at a lower cost [22] or whether larger rewards for
participation should be paid to the more severely affected or
disadvantaged groups for particularly difﬁcult plans (e.g., smoking
cessation, weight loss, and diet control). Moreover, there are results
demonstrating that irrespective of whether one considers simple
health maintenance or complex life intervention plans, those
patients who elect to participate may tend to be healthier or younger
[12,26,33–35]. If it is the case, we wonder what monetary reward
would be required to encourage disadvantaged persons to partic-
ipate in such programs. Identifying disadvantaged patients’ WTA is
crucial because these patients may be more likely to accept beneﬁts
from others than to pay for beneﬁts out of pocket. Thus, WTA could
be a more suitable measure thanWTP for disadvantaged patients. In
addition, disadvantaged patients have the potential to obtain greater
beneﬁts from participating in a lifestyle intervention program and
realize larger cost savings than do typical patients. Thus, in our
study, we applied the DCE method to determine patients’ willing-
ness to participate in a diabetes P4P4P program, with a particular
focus on disadvantaged patients, and explored the likelihood of
participation of patients under different acceptable prices.Methods
Study Sample
The hospitals in this study were selected to balance the socio-
economic differences between urban and rural areas and cover
different capacity levels (district, regional, and tertiary hospitals).
Diabetes educators distributed questionnaires to all patients with
type 2 diabetes (International Classiﬁcation of Diseases, Ninth Revi-
sion, Clinical Modiﬁcation code 250) who were treated in ﬁve
hospitals located in eastern, southern, and northern parts of
Taiwan from March to June 2013.
To determine whether our sample was representative of the
entire diabetes population in Taiwan, we compared selected
variables with information from the National Health Insurance’s
(NHI’s) 2008 diabetes database. The database comprises 1 million
samples randomly retrieved from the Taiwanese population. The
variables used to validate our study sample included age, sex,
income, degree of urbanization in the area of residence, comor-
bidity, and severity (relevant deﬁnitions are provided in the
following paragraph).
Study Format
We used the DCE method to elicit WTA participation in the
diabetes P4P4P plan with respect to several attributes. Because
the maximum number of selected attributes should not exceed
ﬁve or six [36], only four attributes were included in the study and
are presented in Table 1. They include one incentive attribute
(monthly cash rewards for program participation), two activity
attributes (exercise per day and ﬂexibility of diet), and one
program design attribute (program duration) identiﬁed from
evidence-based articles [37] and established through the focus
group. For the incentive attribute, we also obtained information on
the range of WTA values for patients with diabetes participating in
the focus group, who reported the price range that would secure
their participation in the program. The range was between US $33
and US $100 (US $1 equals 30 New Taiwanese [NT] dollars).
Three experts ensured content validity by verifying that the
design of the DCE was robust and that the format and questions
Table 1 – Attributes and levels of the P4P4P
incentive design.
























NT, New Taiwanese; P4P4P, pay-for-performance for patient.
* US $1 is approximately NT$30.
Choice set 1 
 Prefer A  Prefer B  
Cash rewards per 
month  
Exercise per day 30  50  
Diet low-calorie Restricted diet 
Program duration One Three  
Compared with your current situation (participating in an existing 
program/not participating in any program), would you still choose the 




Fig. 1 – An example of the choice sets.
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with 20 patients with diabetes. We asked each hospital’s certiﬁed
diabetes educator to administer the questionnaire. The primary
investigators also trained the diabetes educators in the important
details of the questionnaire, such as how this type of DCE
questionnaire should be administered. If the respondents could
not read or were unfamiliar with the questionnaire form, we
asked the interviewers to read the entire questionnaire in a
manner that the interviewees could understand. To obtain
complete patient comorbidity and severity information, we pro-
vided a list of associated diseases from the literature to allow the
patients to select the appropriate levels of comorbidity and
severity [38,39]. After the completion of the questionnaire, we
also required the interviewers to verify the demographic infor-
mation that the patients provided.
To ensure that individuals acquired all relevant information
before completing the choice sets [40], we provided a summary
sheet of all attributes and levels before the main choice section of
the questionnaire.
The four attributes and their levels gave rise to 24 possible
scenarios in a full factorial design (3  2  2  2).
A D-optimization algorithm was used to generate a blocked
fractional factorial design that jointly maximizes the principles
of orthogonality, level balance, minimal overlap, and utility [41].
In addition, in theory, the increased-overlap method (in which
some attribute levels are identical across all sets of scenarios)
could reduce the cognitive burden, meaning that respondents
may feel less fatigue and experience fewer difﬁculties. Previous
empirical results indicate, however, that while the two methods
do not differ with respect to consistency and perceived difﬁculty,
the minimal-overlap method can increase efﬁciency. Thus, we
adopt the minimal-overlap method (in which attribute levels
varied between each set of scenarios) (please refer to the upper
part of Fig. 1) [42].
Fifteen choice sets were generated. Each choice set had two
pairwise sets of scenarios. To simplify the questionnaires to
increase the response rate, the 15 choice sets were randomly
allocated into three blocks. Each respondent was randomly
assigned to one of the three blocks and completed one of three
surveys containing ﬁve choice sets plus two rationality/consis-
tency test choice sets, which included dominance, and expandedtests. Appendix 1 in Supplemental Materials found at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2015.03.1793 describes the rationales for the
consistency tests in detail. In addition, after making their choices,
the respondents were asked to rate, on a scale ranging from 1
(very easy) to 5 (very difﬁcult), the difﬁculty of the entire DCE
questionnaire.
Patients’ Characteristics
We accounted for numerous characteristics of patients with
diabetes, including age, income, education, employment, obesity
status, comorbidity, severity, duration of diabetes, and degree of
urbanization because these characteristics may affect a patient’s
willingness to participate in diabetes or other types of lifestyle
prevention programs [12,26,43].
We stratiﬁed the patients’ areas of residence into seven
urbanization categories according to the standard published
by Taiwan’s National Health Research Institute. This urban-
ization index consists of ﬁve measures: population density,
education level, percentage of elderly persons, percentage of
agricultural workers, and medical resources. The National
Health Research Institute uses cluster analysis to divide all
the Taiwan’s districts into seven urbanization groups accord-
ing to these measures: high-level, medium-level, emerging,
general, aged, agricultural, and remote [44]. To account for
patient comorbidity, we adopted the Chronic Illness with
Complexity method [38]. This index includes diseases such
as cancer, gastrointestinal only, pulmonary only, musculoske-
letal only, substance abuse, and mental illness. For patient
severity, we adopted Selby et al. and Rosenzweig et al.’s
Diabetes Complications Severity Index [39], which includes
seven categories of complications: retinopathy, nephropathy,
neuropathy, cerebrovascular complications, cardiovascular
complications, peripheral vascular disease, and metabolic
complications. We treated patient comorbidity and severity
as binary variables. If a patient exhibited any of these comor-
bidities or severities, he or she was coded 1 for the comorbidity
or severity variable, 0 otherwise.
Analysis
We followed suggestions from previous rigorous studies and used
a two-step design for the questionnaire [12,45]. For each choice
set, the respondents were ﬁrst asked to identify which of the
Table 2 – Respondents’ demographic characteristics









o65 625 (75) 16,210 (57)
Z65 213 (25) 12,026 (43)
Sex
Male 432 (52) 13,987 (50)
Female 406 (48) 14,249 (50)
Income (US $)
o1000 477 (57) 23,754 (84)












Low urbanization 158 (19) 6,107 (22)
High urbanization 680 (81) 22,129 (78)
Obesity
BMI Z30 145 (17)
BMI o 30 693 (83)
Comorbidity†
Yes 256 (31) 12,728 (45)
No 582 (69) 15,508 (55)
Severity‡
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asked to choose between that preferred alternative and not
participating in any alternative. An example of the choice sets is
presented in Figure 1. This two-step design maximizes the
information obtained concerning both trade-offs among pro-
gram attributes [45]. For levels of categorical attributes, we used
effects codes instead of dummy codes to avoid status quo bias
(the reference level is assigned a value of 1 instead of 0) [46],
whereas incentive cost and program duration were treated as
continuous variables. In addition, for the two-step design, the
dependent variables (the choice between two alternatives vs.
the subsequent choice of whether to participate) are correlated;
hence, we generated coefﬁcients for each level from a bivariate
probit model [12,45]. After determining the coefﬁcients of each
level according to the absolute difference between the coefﬁ-
cients for the highest and lowest levels, we were able to
determine the relative importance of each attribute. We used
SAS Version 9.3 to generate choice sets and estimate the
bivariate probit model.
Similarly, on the basis of these derived parameters, we were
able to estimate the different acceptable prices for the distinct
program designs. We calculated the WTA values/prices under
three conditions: the prices calculated from the total samples, the
prices calculated when excluding irrational cases (the subject
failed one or both tests), and the marginal prices for an increase
in one comorbidity or severity count. All prices were measured
and calculated in NT dollars and converted into and reported as
US dollars for international comparisons. For the ﬁrst two
models, we treated comorbidity and severity variables as binary
variables and treated the comorbidity and severity variables as
continuous counts when calculating the marginal prices of a one-
unit increase in the disease burden in the ﬁnal model. Finally, we
also calculated the predicted probability of participation on the
basis of program designs (program attributes) and patient
characteristics.Yes 368 (44) 11,946 (42)
No 470 (56) 16,290 (58)
Duration 4 3 y
Yes 586 (70)
No 252 (30)
Note. BMI ¼ weight (kg)/height(m)2. Values are n (%).
BMI, body mass index.
* Living area: the high-level, medium-level, and emerging areas
are classiﬁed as a high level of urbanization, and the general,
aged, agriculture, and remote areas are classiﬁed as a low level of
urbanization.
† Comorbidity: a patient with any of the following six diseases:
cancer, gastrointestinal, pulmonary, musculoskeletal, and men-
tal illness, and substance abuse.
‡ Severity: a patient with any of the following seven diseases:
retinopathy, neuropathy, nephropathy, cardiovascular, cerebro-
vascular, and peripheral vascular disease, and metabolic syn-
drome.Results
The original sample size was 843 subjects. We excluded informa-
tion for ﬁve subjects because of missing patient characteristics;
therefore, the ﬁnal sample included 838 subjects. Nine patients
partially completed the preference questions, and hence, we
retained them in the ﬁnal sample for analysis.
Table 2 reports that 25% of the respondents were 65 years or
older. Moreover, 48% of the respondents were female, 57% had an
income of less than US $1000, 27% had an education below
elementary school, 42% were retired, 19% were living in low-
urbanization areas, 17% were obese (body mass index Z 30), 31%
had one or more comorbidity, 44% had some degree of severity,
and 70% had a diabetes duration of more than 3 years. The
format of the questionnaire appears to have been thoroughly
user-friendly and understandable because approximately 97% of
the patients (810 of 838) did not consider the survey to be difﬁcult
(data not reported). When comparing the sample and the nation-
wide data using the six variables extracted from the database, we
found that the distributions of sex, level of urbanization, and
severity were similar for both groups. Our sample was moder-
ately younger and wealthier and presented with somewhat less
comorbidity.
Table 3 reports the estimated participation in a speciﬁc P4P4P
program derived from the bivariate probit model with and with-
out interaction terms. Models 1 and 2 are the probit model
without and with interaction terms, respectively; model 3 was
estimated after dropping the 33 irrational cases, and model 4 was
estimated after dropping the 160 patients failing at least one test.
All four P4P4P design attributes were signiﬁcant (P o 0.001), andexcept for the cash incentive, the other three attributes’ param-
eters in model 3 and model 4 were somewhat higher than those
obtained in the other models. For example, regarding the ﬂexible
diet variable, its parameter becomes large (from 0.161 [model 2] to
0.175 [model 3]) when the irrational respondents are removed.
This indicates that the ﬂexible diet design included in that plan
can serve to substantially offset the utility loss from program
participation. Thus, there is no need to award additional money
to compensate for the utility loss from participating in the
program (see also Table 4). In contrast, the nonpreferred levels
(e.g., a strict diet) also increased; therefore, additional money
Table 3 – Bivariate probit model estimates.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Coefﬁcient SE Coefﬁcient SE Coefﬁcient SE Coefﬁcient SE
Cash incentive per NT $1000 0.139* 0.004 0.139* 0.004 0.137* 0.004 0.128* 0.004
Program duration 0.095* 0.004 0.095* 0.004 0.096* 0.004 0.107* 0.004
Flexible, low-calorie diet 0.161* 0.005 0.161* 0.005 0.175* 0.005 0.218* 0.005
Restricted diet 0.161* 0.161* 0.175* 0.218*
Exercise: 30 min/d 0.094* 0.005 0.094* 0.005 0.108* 0.005 0.133* 0.005
Exercise: 50 min/d 0.094* 0.094* 0.108* 0.133*
No participation (NoPrg) 0.032* 0.006* 0.001 0.007* 0.001 0.006* 0.001
Interaction terms (NoPrg  Patient factors)
NoPrg  Female 0.227* 0.011 0.208* 0.012 0.122* 0.012
NoPrg  Age Z65 y 0.228* 0.018 0.195* 0.019 0.184* 0.019
NoPrg  Income of rUS $1000 0.081* 0.014 0.081* 0.015 0.140* 0.014
NoPrg  rElementary school 0.254* 0.014 0.243* 0.017 0.259* 0.018
NoPrg  Retried 0.074* 0.015 0.082* 0.014 0.052* 0.014
NoPrg  Obese 0.411* 0.016 0.415* 0.016 0.374* 0.016
NoPrg  Low urbanization 0.439* 0.013 0.438* 0.014 0.462* 0.014
NoPrg  Comorbidity 0.327* 0.011 0.304* 0.012 0.290* 0.012
NoPrg  Severity 0.106* 0.011 0.115* 0.011 0.028† 0.012
NoPrg  Diabetes duration 0.590* 0.010 0.613* 0.011 0.676* 0.011
Note. Cash incentive and program duration are continuous variables. NoPrg (binary variable): NoPrg ¼ 1 if respondents chose not to participate
in the program after assessing the trade-offs between a pair of alternatives. Models 1 and 2 are the probit model without and with interaction
terms, respectively; model 3 is the model that eliminates the 33 irrational cases failing both the two tests; model 4 is the model that removes
all 160 patients failing at least one test.
SE, standard error.
* P o 0.001.
† P o 0.05.
Table 4 – Cash incentive (US $) per month needed to













0.5 127* 172* 204* 249*
121† 174† 206 † 259†
107‡ 176‡ 220‡ 290‡
1.0 116* 161* 193* 238*
110† 162† 195† 247†
93‡ 162‡ 207‡ 276‡
1.5 104* 149* 182* 227*
98† 150† 183† 236†
79‡ 148‡ 193‡ 262‡
2.0 93* 138* 170* 215*
86† 139† 171† 224†
65‡ 134‡ 179‡ 248‡
2.5 82* 127* 159* 204*
75† 127† 160† 212†
51‡ 120‡ 165‡ 234‡
3.0 70* 115* 147* 193*
63† 115† 148† 201†
37‡ 107‡ 151‡ 220‡
* Figures are derived from the original sample (n ¼ 838).
† Figures are derived from the sample excluding the irrational
cases that failed both the two tests (n ¼ 805).
‡ Figures are derived from the sample excluding irrational cases
that failed either of the two tests (n ¼ 678).
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Aside from cash incentives, the most-preferred attribute combi-
nations, in descending order, are a ﬂexible, low-calorie diet,
longer program duration, and less exercise time per day for
models 1 and 2. The most-preferred attribute is dieting style: a
ﬂexible, low-calorie diet is preferred across the four models.
All the patient characteristics interacted with the no partic-
ipation variable. The variable with the greatest negative inﬂu-
ence is diabetes duration. The longer a patient has diabetes, the
more difﬁcult it is for the patient to exercise regularly and
control his or her diet; therefore, a larger amount of money
must be invested to secure participation. Moreover, other dis-
advantaged patients, such as those who are elderly, have low
income, are obese, and live in low-urbanized areas or who
experience more comorbidities or greater severity, may be more
likely to not participate in the program; therefore, they require
larger payments to compensate for the decreased utility of the
initiatives.
The parameters derived from the model in Table 3 can be used
to estimate the cash incentives required to compensate patients
with diabetes for the lack of difference between participating in a
P4P4P program and not participating in the program. In Table 4,
the most-preferred program (e.g., a 3-year P4P4P program with a
ﬂexible diet and 30 minutes of exercise per day) required the least
compensation for the loss in utility, US $37 to US $70 per month.
Reducing the P4P4P program by half a year required 1.5 times
more compensation, US $79 to US $104. Adding the restricted diet
requirement to the most-preferred program will require an
increase of US $77 to US $114.
Table 5 indicates that there is an approximately 50% proba-
bility of participating in the program if it is designed as a 3-year
program with a ﬂexible diet and 30 minutes of exercise per day
with cash rewards of US $67 per month.





Flexible diet Restricted diet

























1000 0.37 0.40 0.44 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.20 0.22 0.25
2000 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.30 0.33 0.37 0.24 0.27 0.30
3000 0.47 0.51 0.55 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.28 0.32 0.35
4000 0.53 0.57 0.60 0.45 0.49 0.53 0.40 0.44 0.48 0.33 0.37 0.40
5000 0.58 0.62 0.66 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.46 0.49 0.53 0.38 0.42 0.46
6000 0.64 0.67 0.71 0.56 0.60 0.64 0.51 0.55 0.59 0.44 0.47 0.51
7000 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.57 0.60 0.64 0.49 0.53 0.57
8000 0.74 0.77 0.79 0.67 0.70 0.74 0.62 0.66 0.69 0.55 0.58 0.62
Note. Year indicates the duration of the program (US $1 ¼ NT $30).
NT, New Taiwanese.
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There is a lack of studies applying the DCE method to elicit
diabetes patients’ preferences for intervention programs, such as
the P4P4P design. The study found that the preferred P4P4P
program for patients with diabetes involved a 3-year program
with 30 minutes of exercise per day and a ﬂexible diet. We
constructed a rigorous WTA model to estimate the acceptable
prices under different program designs after considering patient
characteristics likely to reduce participation, such as patients
who were elderly, have low income, are obese, or reside in low-
urbanized areas and those with greater comorbidity and severity
and a longer diabetes history. The patients with diabetes with
these characteristics (comorbidities, poor, etc.) will experience
less utility from participating in the program because they face a
larger personal cost. These types of patients will beneﬁt more
from participating in the program, but larger ﬁnancial rewards
are required to motivate these patients. We found that a moder-
ate incentive can encourage patients with diabetes to participate
in the P4P4P program. Patients require only approximately US $37
to US $70 per month to be indifferent between participating in the
most-preferred program relative to no participation. Those par-
ticipating in the lifestyle intervention program must engage in
the healthy behaviors, such as diet control and additional
exercise, which can improve their health, but patients may
perceive a utility loss from engaging in these behaviors because
of discomfort experience. Financial incentives, however, can be
used to compensate for this loss and hence return participants’
utility to the original level they had experienced before partic-
ipating (no difference) [12,45]. In addition, we demonstrated that
patients with a comorbidity (or severe disease/complication)
have a WTA value that is US $24 (US $11) higher than that of
those who have none of the prespeciﬁed comorbidities (or severe
diseases/complications). The marginal cost of approximately US
$44 must be paid when the average participating patient presents
a one-unit increase in the comorbidity count, and US $17 is the
required cost if he or she faces a one-unit increase in the severity
count (data not shown). Finally, we demonstrated that there is an
approximately 49% probability of participation when the most-
preferred program design was offered, with payments of US $67.
The respondents preferred a longer program duration. One
research revealed that among the attributes of the diabetes
patient intervention program, only ﬁnancial payments inﬂuence
willingness to participate, whereas other attributes (e.g., timespent on the activity) do not [47]. Thus, when patients decide
whether to participate in the program, money may play a crucial
role [43,48,49]. The patients may perceive that they will receive
greater beneﬁts when participating in the longer duration pro-
gram. After agreeing to participate, however, patients may feel
uncomfortable or struggle to adapt and hence withdraw from the
program. Nevertheless, patient participation in the longer dura-
tion program that offers larger incentives is beneﬁcial because
complex behaviors (e.g., changing dietary and exercise patterns
and medication adherence) require effort over a period of time
and often sustained behavior modiﬁcations [21,37]. Thus, if we
were to create a long-term intervention plan that includes a long-
term bonus to incentivize patient participation, perhaps we can
improve the participation rate in the long-term program, and
hence, the complex behaviors of the participating patients could
be changed.
Many recent studies eliciting preferences are more likely to
use the DCE method. For example, many diabetes-related pref-
erence studies focus on the WTP for treatment outcomes, such as
the reduction in weight, A1c, or hypoglycemic events [50,51];
therefore, the prices derived from such research indicate that
patients with diabetes are willing to pay to achieve the targeted
outcome. Few articles emphasize WTP for lifestyle programs that
prevent the deterioration of patients with diabetes. In other
words, these types of programs value regular activities, such as
limited diets and increased exercise to maintain health status,
while the participants pay a certain amount of money to achieve
the desired diabetic outcome [26,27]. These studies, however,
consider WTP rather than WTA. There is lack of studies on
diabetes intervention programs that use the WTA method. Our
study uses a WTA approach based on the perspective of utility
loss [30,31]. In the long run, patients can beneﬁt from participat-
ing in a lifestyle intervention program (e.g., health promotion).
Patients, however, may not be particularly rational or perceive
such long-term beneﬁts, and instead, they may subjectively
believe that they will incur substantial costs or face numerous
difﬁculties when participating in such a program. Patients often
emphasize such costs (e.g., time investment and physical dis-
comfort) over future beneﬁts [12,43,45]. Thus, such intervention
plans typically exhibit low participation rates, especially complex
plans, such as diabetes or obese lifestyle intervention plans
[26,43,52,53]. For example, only 40% of obese patients engage in
weight control practices, and only 15% of eligible persons
participated in a German disease management program
[47,53,54]. A possible explanation for this is that if the patients
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dietary control, they would incur a utility loss, whereas they
otherwise would have chosen to either remain inactive or engage
in lower levels of physical activity or dietary control. Thus, WTA,
which focuses on the loss of a good, represents a promising
approach because it measure the average loss that patients are
willing to accept in exchange for participating in a speciﬁc
program that may be associated with a loss of time or dietary
freedom.
In addition, individuals participating in these types of pro-
grams or satisfying program requirements of physical activity or
dietary control within the speciﬁed time are typically healthier,
younger, or from more advantaged socioeconomic groups
[12,26,33–35,53,55]. For example, regarding exercise (an important
regime for diabetes), there are many barriers that reduce overall
physical activity levels among disadvantaged patients. These
barriers may be individual factors (e.g., older age, poor health
[e.g., obesity and depression], and lower education) and com-
munity factors (e.g., living arrangements) [56–60]. Compared with
other healthier patients, these factors are more signiﬁcant for
disadvantaged patients or patients with greater comorbidity/
severity, and hence the latter may be much less prone to
participate in a program [33]. Monetary incentives play a critical
role in promoting program participation or regular exercise, as
the aforementioned studies have noted [43,47,48]. Greater mon-
etary incentives may be necessary to promote participation in
plans or change behavior among disadvantaged or more severe
patients. This conclusion is consistent with empirical studies
reporting that adults or patients, especially those who are
disadvantaged or in poor health, require larger monetary incen-
tives to participate in walking or colorectal cancer screening
programs, respectively [12,45]. Thus, for the disadvantaged
groups, WTA is crucial in exploring whether they would be
willing to participate in complex behavior change programs.
In our study, we used a WTA perspective and determined the
money amounts using a choice-format questionnaire. We not
only applied the novel PREFS checklist for conjoint or discrete
choice experiments [61] but also assumed that numerous dis-
advantageous factors increased the participants’ utility loss,
which therefore required greater monetary compensation to
incentivize participation. By applying the WTA framework and
considering the disadvantageous factors presented by patients
with diabetes (e.g., more comorbidities, greater severity, and long
duration), the average patient is willing to accept US $67 per
month (US $800 per year) to participate in the 3-year P4P4P plan
with a ﬂexible diet and 30 minutes of exercises per day, and the
likelihood of participation is up to approximately 49%. The price of
US $67 per month falls in the middle of the price range that was
derived from the focus group conducted before the main study.
Compared with other studies related to patients’ willingness
to participate in diabetes intervention programs, van Gils et al.’s
[47] study did not clearly identify the amount of monetary
compensation required to make patients with diabetes willing
to participate in the program [47]. Wanders et al.’s [62] recent
study found that a maximum amount of approximately €300
(ﬁnancial reward of €75 for 3 months) over 1 year (US $369) would
achieve a 50% participation rate. This study, however, devoted
little attention to the patients’ characteristics affecting patients’
willingness to accept the program. In addition, their study had a
low response rate (27%). Bonevski et al.’s study of a smoking
cessation program in 2010 found that 65% of the smokers were
likely to participate in the program if they were to receive an
incentive, and among them, 50% hope to receive the preferred
incentive amount of approximately AU $1500 per year (US $1455;
AU $1 ¼ US $0.97 in October 2010) to participate in the program.
The amount is similar to that observed for our 1-year preferred
program (ﬂexible diet and exercise for 30 min/wk), which requiresan incentive of US $1344 per year (US $1 ¼ NT$31 as of October
2010) [63]. Our analysis from the perspective of utility loss stress
that patients presenting with disadvantaged characteristics will
be less likely to participate in the program, and hence a larger
monetary reward should be paid to compensate for the utility
loss incurred from participation in the program. A WTA study of
typical elderly individuals participating in a walking program
(30 minutes of walking per day, 5 d/wk) [12] reported that a larger
annual incentive (US $1700–US $3500) was required than that
observed in our diabetes WTA study. This difference may indi-
cate that patients with diabetes valued certain beneﬁts of
exercise and diet control to a large enough extent to only require
a partial incentive to compensate for their lost utility. Compared
with normal, healthy individuals, patients with diabetes may
perceive higher beneﬁts of exercise (e.g., walking); hence, the
WTA value for participating in the walking intervention plan was
higher than that for our diabetes intervention program. In
summary, our study demonstrated that offering an incentive of
US $800 per year may result in an approximately 50% likelihood
of encouraging patients with diabetes to participate in the
preferred diabetes intervention program. We believe that the
annual per-patient cost of US $800 proposed in our study is
reasonable in light of the disadvantageous characteristics pre-
sented by the patients. If we do not consider the characteristics of
disadvantaged patients and consider only the least-preferred
program design (restrict diet, exercise for 50 min/wk, a 1-year
duration), the required incentives should be approximately only
half (US $456 per year) those required to compensate for the
utility loss in the most-preferred program. This represents a
substantial cost reduction. Similarly, we found that the WTA
value associated with patients with a one-unit increase in
comorbidity among patients with diabetes is higher (at approx-
imately US $27; [US $44–US $17]) than that for a one-unit increase
in severity. This result is understandable because patients with
diabetes-related severity may be more likely than patients with a
comorbidity unrelated to diabetes to satisfy the strict require-
ments of the programs (e.g., more exercise and limited diet).
Ultimately, some may argue that US $800 per patient per year
is a signiﬁcant amount of money to compensate patients for a
diet and exercise intervention and wish to know the total cost of
this intervention and the potential savings to the health care
market. According to Taiwan’s data on the country’s diabetes
epidemic, we can approximately estimate the cost-effectiveness
of the plan [64,65]. In 2009, there were 1.22 million patients with
diabetes in Taiwan (30,000 patients requiring dialysis services).
If all the patients with diabetes were paid an amount of US $800
per year to participate in the lifestyle intervention program, the
cost would be approximately US $0.98 billion. This is under the
assumption that every patient participating in the program had
the same high adherence rate, and hence their A1c level was
under appropriate control, thereby reducing the possibility of
admission for these patients. Under this assumption, admission
fees would be reduced by approximately US $1.47 billion. In the
optimal scenario, the implementation of this diabetes plan could
save approximately US $0.5 billion in costs and hence reduce
medical expenditures. This is a very rough estimation, however,
and further empirical studies in the Taiwanese context would be
necessary to demonstrate that this type of diabetes plan could
reduce medical costs.
There are some limitations of this study. The study sample
selected from ﬁve hospitals differs somewhat from the national
population in 2008. Our sample was younger, had modestly
higher incomes, and less comorbidity than did the national
population. Regarding income, our information may be more
accurate because NHI’s income data are calculated on the basis of
premiums. Most important, most Taiwanese authorities, such
as central or local governments, may eliminate premiums for
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 5 7 8 – 5 8 6 585certain patients. Our income information considers any income
(including income from the patient’s offspring); therefore, it is
more accurate than the NHI’s premium variable. Regarding the
two underestimated variables (age and comorbidity), by applying
the information retrieved from the database into the formula, we
found that there was a 31% increase in the incentive (US $21 þ
US $67 per month; data not reported) required to compensate an
older program participant presenting more comorbidities. The
result, however, still represents a cost savings (the investment
cost [US $1.29 billion] vs. the admission cost [US $1.47 billion]);
data not reported). In addition, in our study, the patients were
informed that they would be monitored while participating in the
P4P4P program. We did not describe the monitoring procedure in
detail in the DCE questionnaire. We did not inform patients that
they might have to wear a device to monitor physical activity and
have blood work done to monitor their diet. These factors may
inﬂuence the amount of compensation that the patients believe
they should receive in return for participation. Few empirical
studies, however, have demonstrated that these factors are
critical in inﬂuencing willingness to participate in a program.
Few diabetes DCE studies related to lifestyle intervention pro-
grams have provided such relevant information to patients, and
the DCE method cannot capture all the detailed processes
involved for patients participating in the program. In addition,
for simplicity, less loading, and greater accuracy, we adminis-
tered only ﬁve choice sets, in addition to the rationality test, to
every respondent. From the pretest of the questionnaire, we
found that because of the new P4P4P concept and the speciﬁc
questionnaire form (DCE), some of the older respondents needed
the interviewer to explain every choice set or even read each set
of two alternatives to accurately select one. Thus, we randomized
the participants into three groups and asked them to respond to
only 5 choice sets (excluding two items related to rationality and
dominance testing) that were randomly selected from the 15
choice sets. Thus, although all the respondents ultimately com-
pleted a slightly lower number of choice sets, the questionnaire
nevertheless maintains the rigorous characteristics of a DCE
survey. In total, 97% of the respondents indicated that the
questionnaire was not difﬁcult and that they could easily deter-
mine the meanings of the choice sets and accurately report their
preferences.Conclusions
The results suggest that the characteristics of a diabetes P4P4P
program, such as exercise time, diet control, and program
duration, substantially inﬂuence patients’ willingness to accept
the program. The more disadvantaged characteristics that a
patient presented (e.g., more comorbidities and greater severity),
the lower the utility associated with program participation and
the larger the monetary incentive required to compensate for the
loss of utility. Our result demonstrates that a modest ﬁnancial
incentive can increase the likelihood that a patient will partic-
ipate in a program after accounting for the P4P4P program’s
attributes and patients’ characteristics.Acknowledgment
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